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Very few people would dare say that corruption is efficient.
1 Nevertheless some 
scholars, many of whom are economists, may. Leys (1965) even went so far as to wonder 
what “the problem about corruption” was. This provocative claim is backed by various 
theoretical justifications, as Aidt (2003)’s survey shows, but the most common argument in 
favor of the beneficial effects of corruption rests on what is commonly referred to as the 
“grease the wheels” hypothesis. According to that hypothesis, put forward by Leff (1964), 
Leys (1965), or Huntington (1968), corruption may be beneficial in a second best world by 
alleviating the distortions caused by ill-functioning institutions. The grease the wheels 
argument postulates that an inefficient bureaucracy constitutes a major impediment to 
economic activity that some “speed” or “grease” money may help circumvent. Lui (1985) 
offers a formal illustration of this argument and showed that corruption may be an efficient 
way of reducing the time cost of queues. In a nutshell, the grease the wheels hypothesis states 
that, in a second best world, graft may act as a trouble-saving device, thereby raising 
efficiency. 
                                                 
1 Corruption is understood here as the misuse of public office for private benefit, as is now common in the 
literature. 
  1Policy circles however do not share the idea that corruption may sometimes be 
efficient. On the contrary, international organizations like the IMF or the OECD, view 
corruption as a major hindrance to economic development. As a result, the fight against 
corruption has raised considerable attention. This has resulted in international initiatives such 
as the UN Convention against Corruption, adopted in 2003, or the OECD’s “Convention on 
combating bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions”, which 
came into force in April 1999. 
This point of view was recently backed by a strand of empirical literature aimed at 
quantifying the consequences of corruption. This literature was pioneered by Mauro (1995), 
who observed a significant negative relationship between corruption and investment that 
extended to growth. Mauro (1995)’s results were later confirmed by Mo (2001) for example, 
and extended to other macroeconomic variables like foreign direct investment by Wei (2000), 
or productivity by Lambsdorff (2003). 
Strictly speaking though, this evidence does not allow to reject the grease the wheels 
hypothesis but may in fact be consistent with it. Indeed, the hypothesis simply implies that 
corruption is beneficial in countries where other aspects of governance are defective, but 
remains detrimental elsewhere. Therefore, the mere observation that corruption is on average 
associated with more disappointing economic outcomes does not prevent the correlation from 
being positive in those countries where governance is mediocre. The average result may thus 
be driven by the negative correlation between corruption and economic performance in the 
subset of countries whose institutional framework is effective, whereas the correlation may 
indeed be positive elsewhere. 
To our knowledge, attempts to specifically test the grease the wheels hypothesis 
remain scarce. Mauro (1995) rejected it on the grounds that he could observe no significant 
difference in the relationship between corruption and the investment ratio between high red-
tape and low red-tape countries. Ades and di Tella  (1997) also rejected the hypothesis. 
Kaufmann and Wei (1999) tackled the issue from a different angle by using firm-level data. 
They observed that multinationals that pay more bribes also tend to spend more time 
negotiating with foreign countries’ officials, which is hard to reconcile with the grease the 
wheels hypothesis. Méon and Sekkat (2005) studied the hypothesis from a macroeconomic 
perspective. They observed that corruption was detrimental to investment and growth 
everywhere, and especially so in countries with an otherwise defective institutional 
framework. This goes against what the grease the wheels hypothesis predicts but may reveal a 
“sand the wheels” effect of corruption. 
  2However, those contributions do not study the main determinant of cross-country 
differences in economic performance, i.e. productivity, choosing to focus instead on factor 
accumulation and endowments. Yet, evidence that cross-country differences in economic 
performance are the result of differences in productivity is overwhelming, as Caselli (2005)’s 
recent survey points out. Consequently, in order to test the economic significance of 
corruption and of the grease the wheels hypothesis, one must focus on productivity. In other 
words, one must wonder whether corruption helps countries with faulty institutions to take a 
better advantage of their factor endowments. This is precisely the aim of the present paper. 
To do so, this study applies efficiency frontiers to aggregate production functions, 
following Moroney and Lovell (1997). That method provides a synthetic measure of the gap 
between countries’ observed and optimal productions. The interrelationship between 
corruption, efficiency, and the quality of the institutional framework can then be investigated 
to test the grease the wheels hypothesis. This is done by assessing the interaction between 
corruption and a wide range of indicators of the quality of governance, for a panel of 
countries. The results appear to be inconsistent with the sand the wheels hypothesis. Instead, 
they hint at the reverse hypothesis, the grease the wheels hypothesis, which posits that 
corruption is even more harmful to efficiency when governance is poor. 
To reach these conclusions, the remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The 
next section briefly describes the grease the wheels and the sand the wheels hypotheses. 
Section 3 outlines our method. Our data set is presented in section 4. We present our 
empirical results in section 5. Concluding comments may be found in section 6. 
 
2. Two testable hypotheses 
The grease the wheels hypothesis finds its roots in a literature aimed at qualifying the 
conclusions of what was dubbed the “moralistic view” of corruption.
2 Some scholars have 
stressed that corruption may have its own merits in fostering development, and should 
therefore not be judged solely on moral grounds. Their line of reasoning has often rested on a 
few similar considerations emphasizing the accommodative properties of graft in the presence 
of other imperfections in the rest of the political system. However one may also think of 
                                                 
2 The expression “moralistic approach” can for instance be found in Leys (1965) or Nye (1967). Those who 
opposed that view were later deemed “functionalists” or “revisionists” by their own adversaries. On a general 
plane, they seemed to be motivated by a concern that the moral implications of corruption may bias the 
understanding of its economic consequences and by some concern that the western definition of graft may make 
it ill-adapted to the context of developing countries. 
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These mechanisms are at the core of the sand the wheels hypothesis. 
The basis of both hypotheses lies in the distinction between corruption and other 
institutional deficiencies. Leff (1964) for instance made a distinction between corruption as 
such and the inefficiency of bureaucracy, namely its incapacity to attain goals it is given. A 
survey of the two hypotheses is provided by Méon and Sekkat (2005). To save on space, the 
present section only draws on that survey to describe how the impact of corruption on 
efficiency may depend on the quality of the rest of the institutional framework. Our aim is to 
identify a strategy to test the grease the wheels and the sand the wheels hypotheses against 
each other. 
2.1. The grease the wheels hypothesis 
Unsurprisingly, the inefficiency of bureaucracy has often been considered the most 
prominent inefficiency that corruption can grease.
3 The first bureaucratic inefficiency that can 
be compensated by corruption is slowness. Leys (1965) therefore stressed that bribes could 
give bureaucrats an incentive to speed up the establishment of new firms, in an otherwise 
sluggish administration. The same argument was later adopted by Lui (1985) who showed in 
a formal model that corruption could efficiently reduce the time spent in queues. It can also be 
argued that corruption can amend a bureaucracy by improving the quality of its civil servants. 
As Leys  (1965) or Bailey  (1966) claim, when government service wages are low, the 
possibility of perks may attract able civil servants who would otherwise have opted for 
another line of business. 
Some, such as Leff (1964) or Bailey (1966), also argue that graft may simply be a 
hedge against bad public policies. In these authors’ view, this is particularly true if the 
bureaucrat is biased against entrepreneurship, for ideological reasons or due to a prejudice 
against certain minority groups.
4 By simply impeding inefficient regulations, corruption may 
then limit their adverse effects. The causality may in fact be subtler. Ehrlich and Lui (1999) 
thus argue that autocratic regimes, which are able to steer the administration in a centralized 
way, implement policies that are closer, if not equivalent, to first best policies. The reason is 
that they wish to maximize their rents but internalize the deadweight loss associated with 
                                                 
3 As Huntington (1968, p.386) put it: “In terms of economic growth, the only thing worse than a society with a 
rigid, overcentralized, dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, overcentralized, honest bureaucracy”. 
4 Nye (1967) by example reports that corruption was instrumental in making central planning more effective in 
the Soviet Union. He also argues that it helped increase the influence of Asian minority entrepreneurs in East 
Africa beyond what political conditions would have allowed. 
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private sector. This incentive does not exist in more decentralized regimes where no 
bureaucrat perceives the detrimental effect of bribes on productivity. We may conclude that 
corruption provides an incentive to implement better policies in autocratic regimes but not in 
democratic regimes. All things being equal, it is therefore beneficial in countries that are less 
democratic. 
Moreover, it has also been argued that graft may in some circumstances improve the 
quality of investments. This is in particular the case, as Leff  (1964) stresses, when 
government spending is inefficient. If corruption is a means of tax evasion, it can reduce the 
revenue of public taxes and, provided bribers have efficient investment opportunities, 
improve the overall efficiency of investment. More generally, one may contend that 
corruption is an efficient way of selecting investment projects, when such investments depend 
on gaining a license. Bailey (1966) for instance claims that this may be true if the ability to 
offer a bribe is correlated with talent. More specifically, one may argue that awarding a 
license through corrupt methods is very similar to a competitive auction. This intuition was 
offered by Leff (1964) who argues that favors tend to be allocated to the more generous 
bribers, who can only be the most efficient. Beck and Maher  (1986) and Lien  (1986) 
subsequently showed formally that corruption replicates the outcome of a competitive auction 
aimed at attributing a government procurement contract, because the ranking of bribes 
replicates the ranking of firms by efficiency. 
All the above-mentioned arguments share the presumption that corruption may 
positively contribute to the productivity of the factors of production with which a country is 
endowed, because it compensates for the consequences of a defective institutional framework, 
resulting in an inefficient administration, a low rule of law, or political violence. One may 
nevertheless remark that graft also has its drawbacks. Indeed, although bribery may have its 
benefits, it may also impose additional costs in a weak institutional environment. The 
existence of such costs provides a rationale for the sand the wheels hypothesis. 
 
2.2. The sand the wheels hypothesis 
The specificity of the sand the wheels hypothesis is that it emphasizes that some of the 
costs of corruption may precisely appear or be magnified in a weak institutional context. 
For instance, the claim that corruption may speed up an otherwise sluggish 
bureaucracy can be overturned. Myrdal (1968) argues that corrupt civil servants may cause 
  5delays that would otherwise not appear, just to get the opportunity to extract a bribe. 
Kurer (1993) argues along similar lines that corrupt officials have an incentive to create other 
distortions in the economy to preserve their illegal source of income. These arguments are 
perfectly compatible with the experience of individual bribers who can indeed improve their 
own situation thanks to a perk. They stress however that nothing may be gained from 
corruption at the aggregate level.
5
Moreover, there are reasons to believe that corruption may not be the best way to 
award a license to the most efficient producer. Thus, even if the analogy between corruption 
and a competitive auction holds true, the winner is not necessarily the most efficient. In 
auctions where the profitability of a license is uncertain, the winner may simply be the more 
optimistic, according to the “winner’s curse”. Secondly, as Rose-Ackerman (1997) argues, the 
highest briber may simply be the one most willing to compromise on the quality of the goods 
he will produce if he gets a license. Under those circumstances, corruption will simply reduce 
rather than improve efficiency. 
The argument that states that corruption may raise the quality of investment is also 
questionable. There is evidence that this may not be true for public investment. Thus, 
Mauro (1998) observes that corruption results in a diversion of public spending towards less 
efficient allocations. Overall, corruption therefore results in a greater amount of public 
investments in unproductive sectors, which is unlikely to improve efficiency and result in 
faster growth. 
One can also doubt that corruption may serve as a hedge against risk in a politically 
uncertain environment. This can only be true if corruption does not imply additional risk-
taking. However, corruption is not a simple transaction. As it is illegal, the commitment to 
comply with the terms of the agreement may indeed be very weak, which may lead to 
opportunism, especially on the bribee’s part. Furthermore, increased uncertainty due to 
corruption may go beyond corrupt deals themselves. Thus, larger corruption was found to be 
associated with a larger shadow economy, for instance by Dreher and Schneider (2006a, b). 
Since transactions in the shadow economy are by definition unregulated they are therefore 
subject to greater uncertainty than official transactions. 
Consequently, as Bardhan  (1997) points out, the inherent uncertainty of corrupt 
agreements may simply make the efficiency-enhancing mechanisms described in the previous 
                                                 
5 Those effects can be exacerbated when the administration is made of a succession of decision centers or civil 
servants. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) thus build a formal model where the cost of corruption is greater when the 
administration is made of many independent agencies than when it is centrally managed. 
  6section ineffective. This may provide an incentive to invest in general, as opposed to specific, 
capital, which can easily be reallocated but is also less productive, as Henisz (2000) argues. 
As a result, corruption may worsen the impact of political violence or a weak rule of law on 
the quality of investment instead of reducing it. 
 
To conclude, both the grease the wheels and the sand the wheels hypotheses may seem 
reasonable on an abstract plane. However, they both remain very theoretical. Even so, they 
both produce testable hypotheses that are summarized in table 1 below: 
 
Table 1 
Impact of corruption on efficiency 
  Grease the wheels  Sand the wheels 
Effective institutions  detrimental  detrimental 
Ineffective institutions  positive  detrimental 
 
According to table 1, both hypotheses predict that an increase in corruption will 
reduce efficiency in an otherwise efficient institutional context. They differ however in the 
expected impact of corruption in a deficient institutional context. Namely, the grease the 
wheels hypothesis predicts that corruption may help raise efficiency. By contrast, the sand the 
wheels hypothesis predicts that an increase in corruption will reduce efficiency, even in a 
deficient institutional context. In the next section, we describe how we put these two 
competing hypotheses to an empirical trial. 
 
3. Methodology 
In this section, we explain how we measure aggregate efficiency, and then present its 
determinants that are taken into account. 
3.1. Measuring efficiency 
Our aim is to measure aggregate efficiency in order to assess its link with corruption. 
With this end in mind, we apply frontier efficiency techniques. Namely, we assess technical 
efficiency, which measures how close a country’s production is to what a country’s optimal 
production would be for using the same bundle of inputs. To measure efficiency, we use the 
  7stochastic frontier approach, a method developed by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and 
applied at the aggregate level notably by Adkins et al. (2002). 
There are several reasons why macroeconomic productivity is better measured using 
this approach rather than more common measures of productivity. First, it provides a 
synthetic measure of productivity. Indeed, unlike basic productivity measures (e.g. per capita 
income), the efficiency scores computed with the stochastic frontier approach allow us to 
include several input dimensions in evaluating performances. As a result, output is not only 
compared to the labor stock, but also to both the physical and human capital stocks. 
Second, it provides relative measures of productivity. Namely, a common production 
frontier is estimated, which allows the comparison of each country to the best-practice 
countries. As a result, the efficiency score assesses how close a country’s actual production is 
to what its optimal production would be for using the same bundle of inputs. This then gives 
us a relative measure of productivity. 
Third, whereas total factor productivity measures assess performance by the whole 
residual from the production frontier for each country, the stochastic frontier approach allows 
us to separate the distance to the production frontier into an inefficiency term and a random 
error, taking into account exogenous events. 
After having assessed each country’s level of efficiency, we may determine the 
interrelationship between corruption, governance and efficiency in order to test the grease the 
wheels versus the sand the wheels hypothesis. A natural way of estimating this relationship 
would be to resort to a two-stage approach. This approach would consist of first estimating 
efficiency scores, and then regressing them on the relevant set of explanatory variables. 
Although widely used in microeconomic studies, this approach is inconsistent, as it assumes 
in the first stage that inefficiencies are independently distributed, while the second-stage 
regression does not respect the independence assumption. 
Consequently, we resort to the one-stage approach developed by Battese and 
Coelli (1995), whereby the stochastic frontier model includes a production frontier as well as 
an equation in which inefficiencies are specified as a function of explanatory variables. This 
approach is more consistent than the two-stage approach, which explains its application in 
studies of the determinants of technical efficiency at the aggregate level, such as Adkins et 
al. (2002). 
Our stochastic frontier model thus includes two equations. The first one is the 
specification of the production frontier. We assume a constant returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas 
  8production technology
6, which we write as: 
 
ln (Y/L)it = α0 + α1 ln (K/L)it + α2 ln (H/L)it + vit − uit     ( 1 )  
 
where i indexes countries and t the year of observation. (Y/L), (K/L), (H/L) are output 
per worker, capital per worker, and human capital per worker respectively. vit is a random 
disturbance, which reflects luck or measurement errors. It is assumed to have a normal 
distribution with zero mean and variance σv². uit is an inefficiency term, capturing technical 
inefficiencies. It is a one-sided component with variance σu². As is common in the literature, 
we assume a half-normal distribution for the inefficiency term. 
The second equation is the specification of inefficiencies as: 
 
uit =δ zit + Wit           ( 2 )  
 
where uit is country i’s inefficiency, zit is a p×1 vector of p explanatory variables, δ is a 
1×p vector of parameters to be estimated, Wit the random variable defined by the truncation of 
the normal distribution with mean zero and variance σ ² = σu² + σv². 
Finally, we use the Frontier software version 4.1 developed by Coelli (1996) to perform 
the maximum likelihood estimation of the stochastic frontier model. 
 
3.2. Testing the two competing hypotheses 
The test of the grease the wheels and the sand the wheels hypotheses that we use 
consists in assessing how a modification of the quality of the institutional framework affects 
the impact of corruption on efficiency. More precisely, the relationship between the 
coefficient of corruption in expression 2 and the quality of governance must be assessed. 
Following Méon and Sekkat (2005), we do so by including an interaction term between a 
corruption index and a governance index in expression (2), in addition to usual explanatory 
variables. The estimated relationship therefore reads: 
 
uit = δ0 + δ1 corrupi + δ2  corrupi × govi  + δ3  govi +  δc controlit + Wit   (3a) 
 
                                                 
6 When Hall and Jones (1999) estimate aggregate productivity in a related cross-country study, they find that 
results obtained with a Cobb-Douglas production function are very similar to the results obtained when the 
production function is not restricted to that specification. Kneller and Stevens (2003) reached similar conclusions 
when estimating aggregate efficiency frontiers. 
We also adopt constant returns-to-scale because, as Moroney and Lovell (1997, p.1086) put it, “at the economy-
wide level, constant returns-to-scale is virtually compelling”. 
  9where uit is country i’s inefficiency, corrupi a measure of corruption, govi a measure of the 
quality of its institutional framework, and  controlit a vector of control variables. δ0, δ1, δ2, 
and δ3  are scalars, whereas δc is a vector of coefficients. 
A reformulation of expression (3) shows more clearly how it can be used to test the 
grease the wheels and the sand the wheels hypotheses: 
 
uit = δ0 + (δ1 + δ2  × govi) corrupi +  δ3  govi +  δc  controlit + Wit    (3b) 
 
In order to answer the question we address, the key parameters are δ1 and δ2 . To 
understand why, let us first assume that the sand the wheels hypothesis holds. In this case, 
corruption always has a negative impact on efficiency, but that impact worsens when the 
institutional framework deteriorates. The coefficient of corruption must therefore always be 
positive but less so when the institutional framework is efficient. Accordingly, δ1 must be 
positive but δ2 negative. Thereby the positive impact of corruption on inefficiency is a 
decreasing function of the quality of the other dimensions of governance. 
Let us now assume instead that the grease the wheels hypothesis holds. In this case, 
corruption has a positive effect on efficiency when the quality of governance is very low, but 
an effect that becomes negative when the quality of governance is high. Thus, it has a 
negative impact on inefficiency if the index of governance is close to zero. For the coefficient 
of corruption to be negative when govi is very small, coefficient δ1 must be negative. 
However, the “grease the wheels hypothesis” implies that inefficiency is positively correlated 
with corruption when governance is satisfactory, namely when govi is large. δ2 must therefore 
be positive. Moreover, for the grease the wheels hypothesis to be verified, the value must be 
such that the overall coefficient of the corruption index (δ1 + δ2  × govi) may be negative for 
low values of the governance parameter. That is, corruption must be negatively associated 
with inefficiency for at least the worst governed country. 
That δ1 and δ2 bear the necessary signs does not ensure however that the grease the 
wheels hypothesis, as defined in the previous section, strictly holds. Instead, the value of the 
coefficients and the range of the relevant governance index can be such that no country in our 
sample will present a negative overall coefficient of corruption. In this case, the observed 
coefficients simply mean that corruption is detrimental everywhere but less so in countries 
where governance is poor. 
  10One may therefore observe two forms of the grease the wheels hypothesis, depending 
on the value of the coefficients and the range of the relevant governance index. Namely, if the 
relevant governance index can reach such a low level that the overall coefficient of corruption 
may be negative, then greater corruption can indeed reduce aggregate inefficiency in some 
countries. This situation will henceforth be referred to as the “strong” grease the wheels 
hypothesis. If, instead, no country in the sample exhibits a low enough institutional quality for 
the overall coefficient of corruption to become positive, then the estimated coefficients only 
imply that corruption is less detrimental in countries plagued by a deficient institutional 
framework than in other countries. Corruption however remains positively correlated with 
inefficiency in all countries. From now on, this result will be referred to as the “weak” grease 
the wheels hypothesis. In any case, one must keep in mind that even the strong form of the 
grease the wheels hypothesis never implies that corruption improves efficiency in all 
countries. In contrast, it only does in those where governance is defective enough. 
 
4. Data 
We use three sets of data: measures of corruption, measures of the quality of 
governance, and macroeconomic data. These must be described in turn. 
4.1. Corruption data 
Whereas corruption is easily defined as “the use of public office for private gains” (see 
e.g. Bardhan, 1997), its proper measurement is less consensual. Basically, available measures 
of corruption that allow cross-country comparisons fall into three broad categories. The first 
set of indicators uses pools of experts to assess the level of corruption that prevails in a 
country. More often than not, these ratings come from private risk-rating agencies, such as 
Business International Corporation, whose index was used by Mauro (1995) for instance. The 
second type of index is based on the results of surveys conducted on residents that are usually 
carried out by international or non-governmental organizations. The index provided by the 
World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report, used by Wei (2000), falls into this 
category. 
The third category consists of composite indices that aggregate those of the previous 
two categories. This kind of index has two main advantages. First, composite indices allow 
the biases of specific indices to cancel each other out, therefore determining an average 
opinion of corruption. This advantage is sizeable, as basic indicators may be plagued by 
  11important biases since they are subjective by construction. Secondly, composite indices can 
provide data for wider samples of countries because they aggregate several other indices 
thereby allowing one index to fill the gaps of another. 
In this study, we use two composite indices and one survey index to assess the 
consequences of corruption. Each index is used in turn, both as a robustness check and to 
allow comparison with previous studies. Namely, we focus on the corruption index provided 
by the World Bank (henceforth WB), and complement our results with those obtained with 
the Corruption Perception Index (hereafter CPI) published by Transparency International, and 
the corruption index used by Wei (2000) (from now on Wei).  
The CPI index is available directly from the Transparency International website. This 
index is simply an average of other indices. It ranges from zero, the most corrupt situation, to 
ten, the least so. For the sake of clarity, we used the opposite of this index in our 
computations so that an increase in the index can be directly interpreted as an increase in the 
level of corruption. 
The World Bank’s corruption indicator is also a composite index. However it is 
estimated by an unobserved component model instead of being a simple average of existing 
indices.
7 The CPI and the WB indices also differ in the sets of basic indicators of corruption 
that they aggregate.
8 Therefore the two indices are complement each other, since they 
aggregate two different sets of indicators using two different methods.
9
The WB indicator can be found in the Governance database posted on the World 
Bank’s website. It ranges from −2.5 to +2.5. Like the CPI index, it is built so that an increase 
of the index reflects a better control of corruption. To transform it from an indicator of probity 
to an indicator of corruption, it was rescaled so as to increase with the level of corruption. 
Wei (2000)’s index is an extension of the corruption index published in the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 1997. To increase the coverage of his 
dataset, Wei (2000) filled the gaps left by that first index with the information provided by the 
World Bank’s World Development Report 1997. 
Finally, in order to properly compare their estimates, all three indices were rescaled so 
as to range from 0 to 10. 
 
                                                 
7 The construction of the World Bank’s index is described in Kaufmann et al. (1999a). 
8 The interested reader may find an exhaustive description of the composition of each indicator in 
Lambsdorff (1999) and Kaufmann et al. (1999b). 
9 Dreher et al. (2007) moreover found that the CPI was strongly correlated with estimates of the extent of 
corruption based on a structural model. 
  124.2. Governance data 
Like corruption, other facets of governance do not lend themselves easily to an 
objective evaluation. Quantitative indicators of governance therefore rest on subjective 
evaluations. To date, the largest and most comprehensive set of data assessing institutional 
quality is the data set from which our second corruption measure was extracted. Kaufmann et 
al. (1999a, b) classify available indicators of governance into six clusters and aggregated them 
into as many composite indices.
10 Each composite indicator represents a different dimension 
of governance and ranges from –2.5 to +2.5, higher values being associated with better 
governance. They were however all rescaled so as to range from 0 to 10, where 10 
corresponds to the best possible governance. Having already explained the World Bank’s 
corruption index in the previous section, we will now simply give the definitions of the other 
five indicators as reported in Kaufmann et al. (1999b). 
 
Table 2 
Summary statistics on corruption and other governance variables 
Variable Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Corruption  WB  4.16 2.06 0.74 7.20 
Corruption  CPI  3.91 2.62 0.06 7.95 
Corruption  WEI  4.01 2.32 0.50 7.50 
Voice  6.04 1.72 2.66 8.38 
Lackviol  5.58 1.74 2.42 8.38 
Goveff  5.88 1.86 2.74 9.16 
Reg  6.10 0.89 4.32 7.48 
Rulelaw  5.90 1.97 2.56 9.00 
Higher values of corruption indices indicate a greater prevalence of corruption, while other indices 
increase with the governance quality. Those statistics are computed for the sample of 54 countries. 
 
The first pair of indicators measures aspects of governance that have been the focus of 
a literature devoted to assessing the impact of democracy and political stability. More 
precisely, Kaufmann et al. (1999a, b) “voice and accountability” indicator (Voice) measures 
“the extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of 
governments”. It accordingly assesses the openness of the political system. The “lack of 
                                                 
10 For an example of utilization of those indices, one may either refer to Kaufmann et al. (1999b)’s original paper 
or Easterly and Levine (2003). 
  13political violence” indicator (Lackviol) provides an assessment of the political risk associated 
to a country. It “measures perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be 
destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means”. 
The second pair of indicators assesses the soundness of a country’s policies and the 
quality of the administration that is in charge of implementing them. Accordingly, the 
indicator called “government effectiveness” (Goveff), concerns the “perceptions of the quality 
of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of the civil 
servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of 
the government’s commitment to policies”. The “regulatory burden” indicator (Reg) captures 
“the incidence of market unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank 
supervision, as well as perceptions of the burden imposed by excessive regulation”. 
The final indicator provided by Kaufmann et al.  (1999a, b) assesses the level of 
respect of citizens have for their country’s legal framework. This “rule of law” indicator refers 
to “the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society” 
(Rulelaw). A chief component of this cluster is the enforceability of contracts. 
4.3. Macroeconomic data and control variables 
Real output per worker and labor force data are taken from the World Bank Indicators 
database. Real capital per worker data are provided by Nehru and Dhareshwar (1994). They 
were complemented after 1990 by applying the perpetual inventory method on real 
investment figures from the World Bank. Because they are measured in local currency at 
1987 prices, and because our computations require comparisons of output and input levels, we 
convert them in US dollars, using the annual average exchange rate provided by the Macro 
time series database of the World Bank. To smooth the impact of extreme exchange rate 
fluctuations, we use an average of the exchange rate computed over the period 1985-1989. 
Human capital is proxied by the total number of years of schooling of the working-age 
population over 15 years old. That dataset is taken from the Barro-Lee  (2000) education 
dataset, and can be downloaded from the Economic Growth Resources website. 
Due to the limited size of our sample, the number of control variables must remain 
small. We restricted ourselves accordingly to three control variables that are commonly used 
in the literature. The first one is openness to trade. It is proxied by Sachs and Warner (1995)’s 
index (Openness). Although the debate on the impact of trade on growth is at least as old as 
economics itself, recent evidence from Edwards (1998) among others suggests that openness 
may be positively linked to productivity. 
  14The second control variable is the index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization (Ethno. 
Frac.). This index measures the probability that two individuals drawn at random from the 
population of a country do not speak the same language. Mauro  (1995) or Hall and 
Jones (1999) for instance use this index. This variable is usually interpreted as proxying a 
country’s sources of long-term political unrest. 
As a third control variable, we consider latitude (Latitude). A negative correlation 
between distance from the equator and economic performance has repeatedly been reported, 
for instance in Sachs (2001), although no consensual explanation to this finding exists.
11
We focus on the years 1994 to 1997 because 1997 is the latest for which the capital per 
worker ratio is available. Using the contemporaneous vintages of corruption and governance 
indices, we could gather a data set for a sample of up to 54 countries whose descriptive 
statistics are displayed in table 3. That sample features both developed and developing 
countries, as the range of output per worker points out. 
 
Table 3 
Summary statistics on economic and control variables 
Variable Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Y/L 13,856.84  14,844.14  317.99  43,917.22 
K/L 44,392.18  50,528.82  819.42  168,891.01 
H/L 10.91  4.56  2.94  18.37 
Latitude 27.82  17.76  0.23  60.21 
Openness 87.96  30.62  0.00  1.00 
Ethno. Frac.  37.96  30.16  0.00  90.00 
Y/L, K/L, H/L, are respectively output per worker, capital per worker, and human capital per worker. 
Those statistics are computed for the sample of 54 countries. 
 
5. Results 
This section presents the main results of our estimations, and provides an assessment 
of their significance, followed by robustness checks. 
 
                                                 
11 Hall and Jones (1999) however suggest that the history of former colonies may be linked to their location. 
However, tropical diseases and disasters may also be responsible for that relationship. 
  155.1. Findings 
Tables 4a to 4e display our first set of results. In each table, we study the interaction 
between corruption and a different dimension of governance. For each of the three corruption 
indices the relationship is estimated twice, first without interaction between corruption and 
governance, then incorporating an interaction term. The first five lines exhibit the coefficients 
of the estimated production frontier, whereas the lower part of the table is devoted to the 
coefficients of the equation in which inefficiency is explained.
12 Three year-dummies for 
1994, 1995, and 1996 (respectively Year94, Year95, and Year96) were introduced to the 
specification of the production function to control for possible year-specific fluctuations of 
the frontier. 
 
Table 4a: estimation with voice and accountability as the governance variable 













  4a.1  4a.2 4a.3 4a.4 4a.5 4a.6 

























































































































































Sigma  0.1274* 0.0764***  0.0148***  0.0165*** 0.2790**  0.2622 
                                                 
12 A minus sign indicates that an increase in the explanatory variable leads to less inefficiency, that is a rise in 
efficiency. 
  16(1.90)  (4.43) (3.47) (7.01) (1.98) (1.33) 
Log−likelihood  65.432 71.547 104.047  104.520 50.967  51.398 
LRT   12.23 
*** 
 0.946  0.862 
N  216  216 144 144 204 204 
t-statistics are displayed in parentheses under the coefficient estimates. *, **, *** denote an estimate 
significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. 
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Table 4b: estimation with lack of political violence as the governance variable 













  4b.1  4b.2 4b.3 4b.4 4b.5 4b.6 










































































































































































Log−likelihood  61.720 69.292 102.387  104.858 52.093  63.869 






N  216  216 144 144 204 204 
t-statistics are displayed in parentheses under the coefficient estimates. *, **, *** denote an estimate 
significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. 
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Table 4c: estimation with government efficiency as the governance variable 













 4c.1  4c.2  4c.3  4c.4  4c.5  4c.6 












































































































































































Log−likelihood  69.453 75.544 105.264 105.175 71.803 80.853 
LRT   12.18 
*** 
 -0.178    18.09 
*** 
N  216 216  144  144  204 204 
t-statistics are displayed in parentheses under the coefficient estimates. *, **, *** denote an estimate 
significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. 
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Table 4d: estimation with quality of the regulatory framework as the governance variable 













  4d.1  4d.2  4d.3 4d.4 4d.5 4d.6 













































































































































































Log−likelihood  61.681 66.156  101.876  104.831 50.226  53.257 






N  216  216  144 144 204 204 
t-statistics are displayed in parentheses under the coefficient estimates. *, **, *** denote an estimate 
significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. 
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Table 4e: estimation with the rule of law as the governance variable 













 4e.1  4e.2  4e.3  4e.4  4e.5  4e.6 









































































































































































Log−likelihood  63.627  74.518 102.536 105.398  76.729  90.275 






N  216 216  144 144  204 204 
t-statistics are displayed in parentheses under the coefficient estimates. *, **, *** denote an estimate 
significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. 
 
 
At first glance, the estimated production frontiers are stable across estimations. 
Moreover, estimated coefficients are similar to those reported in the literature, as for instance 
in Kneller and Stevens (2003). Year-dummies never exhibit a significant coefficient, which 
suggests that no major shift of the frontier was observed for the years featured in our study. 
  21In addition, all control variables are either intuitively signed or insignificant. Thus the 
openness index is usually correctly signed and often significant. The only exception appears 
with the CPI, where openness can bear a positive and significant sign, although not in all 
regressions, and in particular not in those that feature the interaction term between the CPI 
and governance. The relationship between inefficiency and latitude is less surprising. As 
expected, the sign of its coefficient is either insignificant or negative, implying that 
inefficiency ceteris paribus tends to decrease as one moves away from the equator. Finally, 
ethnic fractionalization is more robust than latitude, as it is positively and significantly 
associated with inefficiency in eleven estimations. Accordingly, more ethnic homogeneity 
appears to be positively correlated with aggregate efficiency. 
With regards to the institutional and corruption variables, the general picture that 
emerges from tables 4a to 4e is strikingly consistent across specifications, and regardless of 
the governance variable taken into account. Thus, in benchmark estimations, that is odd-
numbered ones, the relevant governance indicator is always negatively signed or insignificant, 
the only exception being voice and accountability in the estimation that also features the CPI 
among regressors. Accordingly, aggregate efficiency unsurprisingly rises with the quality of 
governance as measured by the World Bank indicators. 
In the same benchmark estimations, corruption indices lead to the same qualitative 
results. Namely, the coefficient that affects corruption is positive in six estimations out of 
fifteen, insignificant in seven estimations, and negative in only two estimations. If anything, 
this finding means that greater corruption is on average associated with greater inefficiency in 
the sample of our study. Again these results are in line with previous results on the impact of 
corruption on growth, like Mauro (1995), or productivity growth, like Olson et al. (2000). 
However, the most striking result, which is central to the question that is raised in the 
present paper, materializes in even-numbered estimations, i.e. when the interaction term 
between corruption and other facets of governance is added to the set of explanatory 
variables. The coefficients that were significant in odd-numbered estimations remain 
significant after including the interaction term. The only exception is the voice and 
accountability index in estimation 4a.4, whose sign already appeared odd in 4a.3. In some of 
our estimations, coefficients that were not significant become significant. This is particularly 
the case of governance indices that are almost always significantly negative in these 
estimations, while they were often insignificant in previous estimations. Moreover, log-
likelihood most of the time substantially increases with the inclusion of the interaction term, 
and even-numbered estimations pass the log-likelihood ratio test against odd-numbered ones. 
  22The last two findings are arguments against the pooling of countries regardless of the quality 
of their institutional framework. 
But the truly remarkable feature of even-numbered estimations appears when one 
looks at the coefficients of corruption and of the interaction term. We observe that in these 
estimations corruption exhibits either a negative or insignificant coefficient. In addition, the 
interaction term is also either positive or insignificant. In terms of our specification, these 
results mean that in general δ1 is negative while δ2 is positive. In other words, we find 
evidence of the grease the wheels hypothesis. 
Finding that δ1 is negative and δ2 positive may be consistent with both the strong and 
the weak form of the grease the wheels hypothesis. As indicated by expression (3b) 
discriminating between the two versions of the grease the wheels hypothesis requires to 
determine whether parameters δ1 and δ2 are such that the overall impact of corruption on 
inefficiency may be negative for some low values of the relevant governance index. In order 
to determine whether the displayed estimations are consistent with the strong version of the 
grease the wheels hypothesis, one must study each estimation in turn and examine jointly the 
estimated δ1 and δ2, and the range of the relevant governance index in the sample. 
With these remarks in mind, one may classify our featured estimations in three 
categories. The first category consists of the estimations that show no sign of any relationship 
between corruption and efficiency. These are the estimations where neither δ1 nor δ2 is 
significant. Estimations 4a.4. and 4c.4 come into this category. 
The other two categories are those consistent with either form of the grease the wheels 
hypothesis.
13 These require closer scrutiny. The weak form of the hypothesis appears in 
estimations 4a.6, 4b.4, and 4d.2, where δ2 is significantly positive but δ1 is not significantly 
different from zero. As governance indices are always positive, these estimations imply that 
corruption is positively associated with inefficiency in all countries, but more so in countries 
where governance is satisfactory. This is precisely what the weak form of the grease the 
wheels hypothesis predicts. 
The last category comprises all the estimations that show evidence of the strong form 
of the grease the wheels hypothesis. The δ1 and δ2 coefficients of those estimations are such 
that the overall coefficient of corruption can be negative, at least for the country that exhibits 
the lowest value of the governance index. To illustrate this phenomenon, let us for instance 
                                                 
13 There is no estimation where corruption remains positively and significantly correlated with inefficiency after 
the introduction of the interaction term. In other words, we find no instance of the sand the wheels hypothesis. 
  23focus on estimation 4c.2, which estimates the interaction between corruption, as measured by 
the World Bank index, and government effectiveness. According to this estimation, 
δ1 ≅ −0.4692 and δ2 ≅ 0.0765. In addition, the country that fares worst in terms of government 
effectiveness (i.e. Zimbabwe) scores 2.74 on the government effectiveness index. 
Consequently, the total coefficient of corruption for this country is equal to 
(−0.4692 + 0.0765 × 2.74) ≅ −0.2596. According to estimation 4c.2, this country may 
improve its efficiency by allowing corruption to rise. Moreover, all countries whose 
government effectiveness index is lower than −δ1 / δ2 ≅ 0.4692/0.0765 ≅ 6.13 may face the 
same possibility. This means that 29 countries in the sample may be in a position to benefit 
from a rise in corruption. Similar findings are obtained in estimations 4a.2, 4b.2, 4b.6, 4c.2, 
4c.6, 4d.4, 4d.6, 4e.2, 4e.4, and 4e.6. 
 
Table 5: summary of estimations 
 
  WB CPI WEI 
Voice 
Strong GWH 
Threshold ≅ 3.70 
6 countries 
 Weak  GWH 
Lackviol 
Strong GWH 












Threshold ≅ 5.39 
26 countries 
Reg Weak  GWH 
Strong GWH 
Threshold ≅ 5.47 
6 countries 
Strong GWH 




Threshold ≅ 5.48 
25 countries 
Strong GWH 
Threshold ≅ 4.91 
1 country 
Strong GWH 




In a nutshell, out of the fifteen estimations that include an interaction term, ten show 
evidence of the strong form of the grease the wheels hypothesis, three are consistent with the 
weak form of the grease the wheels hypothesis, and two show no sign of a relationship 
between corruption and efficiency. None of them suggests a systematic detrimental effect of 
corruption on aggregate efficiency. Furthermore, it must be pointed out that at least one 
estimation consistent with the strong form of the grease the wheels hypothesis can be found 
for each dimension of governance. All in all, one can conclude that there is clear evidence of 
some form of grease the wheels hypothesis. 
  24An interesting by-product of our estimations is that they allow us to gauge the relative 
importance of the interrelationship between corruption and each of the five dimensions of 
governance being analyzed.
14 It appears then that government efficiency is clearly the most 
robust governance index in our sample. It is thus significantly associated with inefficiency in 
all three baseline estimations and all three estimations that include an interaction with 
corruption. This is reassuring insofar as this is the aspect of governance that corruption is 
theoretically meant to grease. On the other hand, voice and accountability performs worst of 
the various dimensions of governance. Namely, it only appears significantly in one baseline 
estimation and two that include an interaction term. This finding is by and large consistent 
with the literature, where the correlation between democracy and economic outcomes usually 
appears fragile. 
Finally, all other indices only appear significant in one baseline estimation out of 
three, as well as in all estimations including an interaction term. 
Our findings therefore contrast with previous empirical results that have in general 
supported a clear negative impact of corruption on economic performance, such as 
Mauro (1995), or Mo (2001). Most often they have not taken into account the non-linearity of 
the estimated relationship. Thus it must be emphasized again that we could achieve more 
usual results in our benchmark estimations where the interaction of corruption with other 
dimensions of governance was not controlled for. The fact that our results are clearly at odds 
with those of Méon and Sekkat (2005), where those interactions were specifically taken into 
account may seem somewhat more puzzling. It must however be said that our estimations 
cannot be directly compared with those of the above-mentioned authors. Méon and 
Sekkat (2005) focused on the impact of corruption on growth and investment, while in this 
paper we analyze aggregate efficiency. Also, their period of study is 1970-1998, whereas we 
have focused on the years 1994-1997. 
 
5.2. A quantitative assessment 
To get a feel of the quantitative significance of our results, let us focus on three 
countries from our sample whose government efficiency indicators differ, say the Philippines, 
Tunisia, and Chile, and see what a reduction of corruption would imply for them. Our first 
                                                 
14 The results also underline differences between corruption indices. The results obtained with the World Bank’s 
index and Wei’s index look very similar, while the CPI index stands out as slightly less robustly associated with 
efficiency than the other two. Although we have no ready explanation for these differences, the size of the 
sample may well play a sizeable role here. 
  25country is plagued by a deficient government. The government efficiency index of our second 
country is close to the threshold estimated in table 5. And finally, our third country boasts a 
government efficiency index well above the estimated threshold. To save on space, we focus 
on government efficiency, as it is the most relevant dimension of governance for the grease 
the wheels hypothesis. A similar exercise could be done with other indices. Let us now 
assume that these countries succeed in bringing down corruption by one standard deviation of 
the World Bank’s corruption index, i.e. two points. Such a reduction would approximately 
bring down the level of corruption to that of Italy for the Philippines, to that of Chile for 
Tunisia, and to that of the Netherlands for Chile.
15
The coefficients estimated in estimation 4c.2 allow us to evaluate the impact of such a 
reduction of corruption on the aggregate efficiency of these three countries under study.
16 To 
do so, the first step is to compute the overall coefficient of corruption for each country. With 
δ1 ≅ −0.4692 and δ2 ≅  0.075, the overall coefficient of corruption reaches –0.0668 in the 
Philippines, −0.0097 in Tunisia, and +0.092 in Chile, given their governance indices.
17 The 
same reduction in the World Bank corruption index would therefore result in a different 
impact on efficiency, and hence income. Thus, given each country’s initial efficiency score 
and the quality of its government efficiency, the Philippines would witness a drop of 49.3 
percentage points of its efficiency score, while Chile would see its efficiency score rise by 
50.69 percentage points. The reduction of corruption will be accompanied by a small 5.76 
percentage points reduction of Tunisia’s efficiency score. 
Moreover, these variations in efficiency are synonymous to variations in output per 
worker since they reflect each country’s distance to the common production frontier.
18 Thus, 
the Philippines’ output per worker would fall from 1567 to 795 dollars per year, which is 
similar to that of Kenya. On the other hand, Chile’s output per worker would rise from 7029 
to 10590 dollars per year, which would bring it close to Portugal. Finally, Tunisia’s output per 
worker would only rise marginally, from 4081 to 4316 dollars per year. This is not surprising, 
                                                 
15 The rescaled value of the World Bank corruption index is equal to 5.46 for the Philippines, 4.96 for Tunisia, 
and 2.94 for Chile. Following a two points reduction in their indices, those countries would respectively end up 
near Italy, whose index is 3.4, Chile, whose index is 2.94, and the Netherlands, whose index is equal to 0.94. 
16 In fact, the estimated coefficients do not directly measure the first derivative of efficiency with respect to 
corruption. Instead, they measure the derivative of ui, defined as ui = −log(efficiency). The variation of efficiency 
can therefore be estimated as  () i i u u efficiency efficiency Δ Δ ⋅ ∂ ∂ = . 
17 Recall that the coefficient of corruption in a country is a function of that country’s government efficiency. The 
government efficiency index of the three countries under study is respectively equal to 5.26 for the Philippines, 
6.26 for Tunisia, and 7.34 for Chile. 







y = . 
  26since government effectiveness in Tunisia is very close to the threshold value. The coefficient 
of corruption in that country is therefore very close to zero. At any rate, the main message of 
these simulations is that the impact of a reduction of corruption on output may be dramatic in 
countries where the governance index takes on extreme values.
19 However, that impact varies 
wildly with the quality of the rest of the institutional framework, and can be either positive or 
negative. 
 
5.3. Robustness checks 
Although our results are obtained while controlling for several country-specific traits, 
one may wonder whether they are not subject to a multi-colinearity problem. Namely, one 
may for instance expect a positive correlation between corruption and other governance 
indicators on the one hand, and the three control variables on the other hand. It can thus be 
argued that greater openness to trade may reduce corruption or improve the institutional 
framework, as it encourages ideas to circulate and subjects domestic practices to foreign 
scrutiny. One may also suspect ethnic fractionalization to affect both institutions and 
economic performance, through its impact on trust and social cohesion. Finally, geography 
and latitude may also affect both economic performance, as suggested by Sachs (2001), and 
income, because, historically, it determined the strategy of colonizers, as Acemoglu et 
al. (2001) argue. 
To check the robustness of our results to the choice of control variables, we therefore 
ran our estimations again, dropping one control variable at a time then dropping all of them.
20 
As table A1 in the appendix shows, our results were only slightly affected, either qualitatively 
or quantitatively. 
Another source of skepticism was that our estimations did not discriminate between 
developed and developing countries. Pooling countries regardless of their level of 
development may nevertheless neglect the fact that they may be operating along different 
production frontiers. In addition, the determinants of efficiency may differ across developed 
                                                 
19 Those orders of magnitude may even seem huge. One should recall that cross-country output level differences 
pertain to the long term, as Hall and Jones (1999) remark. The present orders of magnitude are moreover in line 
with those reported in the literature. For instance, Mauro (1995) finds that a one standard deviation reduction in 
corruption can raise an economy’s growth rate by 0.8 points. After a couple of decades, this would result in a 
difference in its level of GDP comparable to the one that we describe here. Along similar lines, Hall and 
Jones (1999) observe that differences in institutional quality can account for a 25.2 to 38.4-fold difference in 
output per worker across countries. 
20 To save on space, we restrict ourselves to one index of corruption, the World Bank index, and to one index of 
institutional quality, namely government effectiveness, which is the most relevant to test the grease the wheels 
hypothesis. 
  27and developing countries. To address this issue, we split our sample into two equivalent 
subsets according to per capita income, and created a dummy variable equal to one for every 
observation whose per capita income is greater than the median, and zero elsewhere. We then 
used this dummy variable in two ways. First, we interacted it with production factors’ stocks, 
and included the resulting interaction terms as well as the dummy variable itself into the 
expression of the production frontier. This is equivalent to estimating a distinct production 
frontier for each sub-sample. The results displayed in table A2 of the appendix show that the 
coefficients of the corruption and governance indices were only slightly affected. Second, we 
added the dummy variable to the set of explanatory variables. The result of this estimation, 
also reported in table A2, also exhibits little influence on governance indicators. Our findings 
are therefore robust to distinguishing developed and developing countries. 
We were also concerned that our results may be contingent on the period of study. We 
accordingly estimated the production frontier with data pertaining to the 1988-1990 period. 
That earlier period of time allowed for an additional robustness check, which consisted in 
using a different dataset on output and capital per worker, namely Easterly and 
Levine (2001)’s dataset. Table A2 reports the results of these estimations. Once again, the 
coefficients of the governance and corruption indices remained significant, and exhibited 
signs consistent with the grease the wheels hypothesis. 
Our final concern was that the results might be driven by the Cobb-Douglas 
specification of the production frontier with constant returns to scale. We therefore tested two 
alternative specifications. The first one is a translog production function, which is specified as 
follows: 
ln (Y/L)it = α0 + α1 ln (K/L)it + α2 ln (H/L)it + α3 [ln (K/L)it]
2 + α4 [ln (H/L)it]
2
       +  α5 ln (K/L)it ln (H/L)it + vit − uit       ( 4 )  
 
The second one is a production frontier with variable returns to scale. Namely, the 
production frontier is similar to the one presented in equation (1) if we except that production, 
physical capital and human capital are not normalized by labor, and that labor is added as a 
term in the frontier. The results of these estimations are displayed in table A3. In both 
estimations, the coefficients of the corruption and governance indices remained similar to 
previous ones, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Our results are therefore robust to various 
specifications of the production frontier.  
Our findings have thus survived several robustness checks, leading to coefficients of 
the corruption and governance indices that are consistent with the grease the wheels 
  28hypothesis. More to the point, it must be stressed that their magnitude was systematically 
consistent with the strong form of the grease the wheels hypothesis, implying that corruption 
may lead to greater efficiency in some countries of the sample. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
The present paper specifically tests the grease the wheels hypothesis and the sand the 
wheels hypothesis of corruption by focusing on aggregate efficiency. Unlike most previous 
studies, the results provide no evidence of the sand the wheels hypothesis but substantial 
evidence of the grease the wheels hypothesis. Both the weak and the strong forms of the 
grease the wheels hypothesis are observed. Namely, although it is repeatedly found that 
corruption is less detrimental in countries where the rest of the institutional framework is 
weaker, our estimations do not always imply that an increase in corruption may be beneficial 
in at least one country in the sample. However, for each of the five dimensions of governance 
taken into account, we find evidence of the strong grease the wheels hypothesis in at least one 
estimation. 
A possible policy implication of these results might be that countries plagued with a 
very inefficient institutional framework may benefit from letting corruption grow. This 
interpretation is however extreme and risky. A country that would let corruption frolic may 
find itself stuck later on with an even worse global institutional framework, and thus end up in 
a bad governance/low efficiency trap. 
Encouraging countries to fight corruption while also striving to improve other aspects 
of governance, mainly government efficiency, constitutes perhaps a safer advice. Indeed, 
successful policy package should be multifaceted, while narrower reform programs may 
instead prove counter productive. Which of these two sets of advice to follow depends 
however on the dynamics of the interrelationship between corruption, governance, and 
economic performance, which is not fully understood yet. Understanding these dynamics 
should therefore feature highly on the political economy research agenda. 
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A1: Countries in the sample 
 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Colombia; Costa Rica, 
Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, 
India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea (Republic), 
Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, 
Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, USA, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe. 
 
All countries are part of the sample for the World Bank measure of corruption. 
Countries in italics are not part of the sample for the CPI measure of corruption. Countries in 
bold are not part of the sample for the WEI measure of corruption. 
 
  30A2: Robustness checks 
 
Table A1: sensitivity to changes in the set of control variables 
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Loglikelihood  75.184 75.245 75.245 74.217 
N  216 216 216 216 
t-statistics are displayed in parentheses under the coefficient estimates. *, **, *** denote an 
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Table A2: specificity of developing countries and sensitivity to the estimation period 
  Development 
dummy in the 
frontier 
Development 





 A2.1  A2.2  A2.3 


















D  0.2417 
(0.36) 
  
D*Log (K/L)  0.1998*** 
(3.05) 
  
D*Log (H/L)  0.1471 
(1.20) 
  















Year88     –0.0193 
(–0.62) 
Year89     –0.0058 
(–0.19) 










































D   -0.0074 
(-0.06) 
 






Loglikelihood  90.255 75.538  66.922 
N  216 216  186 
t-statistics are displayed in parentheses under the coefficient estimates. *, 
**, *** denote an estimate significantly different from zero at the 10%, 
5% or 1% level. 
 
  32Table A3: sensitivity to the specification of the production function 
  Translog 
form 
Variable returns to 
scale 
 A3.1  A3.2 




Log (K/L)  2.0178*** 
(7.53) 
 
Log (H/L)  -1.6115** 
(-2.43) 
 
[Log (K/L)]²  -0.1228** 
(-1.96) 
 
[Log (H/L)]²  -0.0299** 
(-2.28) 
 
Log (K/L)×Log (H/L)  0.2268*** 
(4.84) 
 
Log (L)   0.0915* 
(1.91) 
Log (K)   0.7829*** 
(37.55) 
Log (H)   0.1473** 
(2.45) 












































Loglikelihood  88.693 78.304 
N  216 216 
t-statistics are displayed in parentheses under the coefficient estimates. *, **, *** denote an 
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